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A. CHARLES JACOBSEN 
B. VEDA DARE 
C. RICK NEBEKER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah, Section 78-2-
2(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and Rules 3(a) and 
4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the trial court error in granting plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate 
court accords no deference to the trial court's conclusions of 
law and reviews them for correctness. Krantz vs. Holt. 819 P.2d 
352, 353 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, the appellate court views "the 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party." Id. 
ISSUES PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
The foregoing issues were preserved for appeal in 
defendants' memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. (R.165) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a mobile home park eviction case. Charles Jacobson 
is the general partner of All Seasons Mobile Home Park. Dare and 
Nebeker were residents of the All Seasons Mobile Home Park, 
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leasing space number 30. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged 
that Dare and Nebeker failed to comply with certain mobile home 
park rules after receiving a 15-day notice to comply with seven 
(7) alleged rule violations. Therefore, their lease was 
terminated on a motion for summary judgment. 
Of the seven (7) alleged rule violations, five (5) were 
completed prior to the expiration of the 15-day Notice. The last 
two (2) items (painting an outside shed and storing certain items 
in the shed) were completed shortly thereafter. Because of 
inclement weather in November, 1996, rain would streak the new 
paint on the shed (requiring repainting) and defendants were not 
able to complete painting their shed or storing certain items in 
their shed until shortly after the 15-day period had expired. 
Under the doctrine of substantial performance, defendants are 
entitled to a trial to determine whether there was substantial 
compliance with the 15-day Notice. 
FACTS 
1. On April 1, 1995, Veda Dare and Rick Nebeker ("Dare and 
Nebeker") entered into a lease agreement with All Seasons Mobile 
Home Park Community ("All Seasons") for a mobile home spaced 
located at 246 Fall Street #30, Salt Lake City, UT 84116. 
(R.110.) 
2. On October 29, 1997, All Seasons served Dare and Nebeker 
with a "Landlord's 15-day Notice" pursuant to Section 57-16-5, 
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Utah Code Annotated 1953. (R.110) 
3. The 15-day Notice alleged seven (7) "rule violations'7 
which Dare and Nebeker were requested to cure within 15-days: 
a. Items stored in the back yard needed to be moved; 
b. A truck up on jacks in the driveway needed to be 
moved; 
c. A wire mesh screen needed to be removed; 
d. The shed needed to be repainted and the back door 
of the shed repaired; 
e. Vehicles parked on the lawn needed to be moved; 
f. Any guests living with Dare and Nebeker needed to 
leave; and 
g. Dare and Nebeker needed to give 60 days notice 
prior to selling their home and terminating their 
lease. (R.15-16.) 
4. By the end of the 15-days, five (5) of the seven (7) 
alleged rule violations had been cured, ;to wit: 
(i) The truck "up on jacks" was moved and no further 
repair work was done. (R.189.) 
(ii) The wire mesh screen was removed.1 (R.189.) 
(iii)No vehicles were parked on the lawn 
after the 15-day Notice was served. 
(R.189.) 
(iv) No guests lived with Dare and 
Nebeker after receiving the 15-day 
Notice.2 (R.189.) 
lThe wire mesh screen had been removed prior to the service 
of the 15-day Notice. (R.189-90 
2No guests had been residir 
time the 15-day Notice was served or prior thereto. (R.189.) 
ing with Dare and Nebeker at the 
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(v) Dare and Nebeker had not sold their 
home or attempted to terminate 
their lease, consequently there was 
no need to give 60-days notice 
prior thereto. (R.188.) 
5. Dare and Nebeker began completion of the final two items 
immediately after receiving the 15-day Notice, but were unable to 
complete them within the 15-days because of adverse weather 
conditions. (R.186, 192-93.) 
6. The final two items included painting the shed and 
cleaning up the back yard. Because item could not be stored in 
the shed while it was being painted, Dare and Nebeker could not 
finish cleaning the back yard until the shed had been painted and 
the paint had dried. (R.192-93.) 
7. By November 22, 1996, 9 days after the 15-day Notice had 
run, Dare and Nebeker had still not completed painting of the 
shed. Dare and Nebeker had to wait until the weather was warm 
enough and dry enough to paint the shed. When the shed was 
painted, the rain streaked the shed and the shed had to be 
repainted. (R.193.) 
8. Pictures taken by All Seasons on November 22, 1996, 
demonstrate the foregoing. (See pictures, E(6), E(5), E(7), 
E(8), E(9) and E(10).) There is a picture of a ladder with a 
paint roller. The pictures also show it has recently rained. 
(R.183.) 
4 
9. As weather permitted (and prior to the filing of the 
Complaint), defendants were able to complete painting of the shed 
and store most of the items in the shed. (R.193-94.) 
10. As to certain cinder blocks, Rick Nebeker asked the 
park manager, Brenda Bottoms, if the cinder blocks could be 
stored outside. Brenda Bottoms gave him permission to do so. 
(R.194.) 
11. In February, 1997, defendants purchased a new shed. 
Plaintiff took pictures of the new shed which was not yet been 
assembled (See "Rubbermaid" packaging.) (See Exhibits F2, F3, 
F4, F5, F6.) (R.193.) 
12. In Spring, 1997, over a two day period, defendants did 
"spring cleaning" of their shed. Everything was moved out, 
reorganized, and then replaced in the shed. (R.188.) 
13. Plaintiff took pictures of the new "Rubbermaid" shed 
and the items moved out of the shed during the 2-day "spring 
cleaning" period and has presented these pictures out of context 
in an attempt to mislead the Court. (See Exhibits F2, F3, F4, 
F5, F6, Gl, G2 and G3.) (R.188 and 193.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Of the seven (7) items listed on the 15-day Notice, five (5) 
were completed prior to the expiration of the 15-day Notice. The 
last two (2) items were completed shortly thereafter. Because of 
the weather defendants had to wait until it was warm enough and 
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dry enough to paint and then rain would streak the new paint and 
the shed would have to be repainted. Therefore, defendants were 
not able to complete painting the shed or storing items in the 
yard until shortly after the 15-day period had expired. Prior to 
filing the Complaint, the shed was painted and the items in the 
yard stored in the shed (except for the cinder blocks which the 
park manager approved to be stored by the mobile home.) 
Substantial performance is sufficient under Utah law and 
defendants are entitled to have a finder of fact determine 
whether there was substantial performance. The trial court 
errored in granting summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court errored in granting plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment since their is a factual issue as to whether 
defendant's substantially complied with the 15-day notice. 
A. Under Utah Law, "Substantial Compliance" With 15-day 
Notice Is Sufficient. 
Under Utah law, a mobile home lease cannot be terminated for 
"rule violations" unless a "15-day Notice" is issued by the 
mobile home park owner to the tenant pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 57-16-5(1): 
An agreement for the lease of mobile home 
space in a mobile home park may be terminated 
during its term...for one or more of the 
following causes: 
(1) failure of a resident to comply with a 
mobile home park rule for a period of 
15-days after receipt of a notice of 
noncompliance from the mobile home park. 
In this case, defendants were served with a 15-day Notice on 
October 29, 1996, alleging seven (7) rule violations. Within 15-
days, defendants had completed five (5) of the items, but two (2) 
remained to be completed — paint the shed and store items inside 
the shed. Although the shed had been painted, rain streaked the 
paint requiring repainting and items in the back yard could not 
be stored inside the shed until the paint had dried. 
Under Utah contract law, the Court's recognize a general 
policy against forfeiture of contractual rights and will not 
forfeit a contract where there has been "substantial compliance." 
U-Beva Mines vs. Toledo Mining Company, 471 P.2d 867, 869 (Utah 
1970). The Courts will not forfeit a lease where there has been 
a "minor breach" and where the leasee has "substantially complied 
with the lease in good faith." Housing Authority of Salt Lake 
City vs. Delgado, 914 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah App. 1996). See 
generally 17A C.J.S. Contracts, Section 508(b) (1963); 17A 
AmJur2d Contracts, Section 373. 
The Court's have also adopted the doctrine of "substantial 
performance" as it relates to the statutory compliance. For 
example, Section 38-1-7 provides that a mechanic's lien must be 
filed "within 90-days" after work is completed. The 90-days 
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begins to run after the construction has been "substantially 
completed." Palombi vs. D&C Builders, 452 P.2d 325, 327 (Utah 
1969); see also Interior Constructing, Inc. vs. Smith Halander & 
Smith Associates, 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992.) 
A trustee's sale held pursuant to the Utah Trust Deed Act 
will be upheld if there is "substantial compliance" with the Utah 
Trust Deed Act. Concept Inc., vs. First Security Realty Service, 
Inc. 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987) ("substantial compliance" 
statutory notice requirements of trustee's sale is sufficient to 
uphold validity of trustees sale); Occidental Nebraska Fed Ser 
vs. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990) (upholding trustees sale 
even though beneficiary failed to "comply strictly with 
procedural requirements that should precede a trustee's sale.") 
In this case, the trial court errored in granting 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because there is an issue 
of fact as to whether defendants substantially complied with the 
15-day Notice. 
B. There Is A Factual Issue As To Whether Dare and Nebeker 
Substantially Complied With The 15-day Notice. 
In this case, five (5) of the seven (7) items listed in the 
15-day Notice were completed on time. The last two were not 
completed on time. The reason the last two were not completed on 
time was because of inclement weather. In the 15-day Notice, tfye 
mobile home park requested that Dare and Nebeker paint the shed 
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and clean the yard in November, 1996. Because items in the yard 
could not be stored in the shed until it was painted, cleaning 
the yard could not be completed until the shed was painted. 
Defendants "substantially complied" with the 15-day Notice "in 
good faith" and any breaches were "minor." Delgado at 1165. 
Even though two (2) items were completed beyond the 15-days, a 
finder of fact could determine that there was "substantial 
compliance." The trial court errored in granting summary 
judgment. There is a material issue of fact as to whether 
defendants "substantial complied" with the 15-day Notice. 
C. Photographs Dated After December 10, 1996 Are 
Inadmissable. 
Pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
photographs after December 10, 1996, the date that the Complaint 
was filed, are inadmissable and should not be considered for 
purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment. The only issue is 
whether plaintiffs have stated the cause of action in their 
Complaint filed on December 10, 1996. Plaintiff cannot seek to 
prove violations alleged on that date by introducing evidence of 
other alleged violations at a later date. Rule 404(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits such evidence. 
Furthermore, the photographs taken after December 10, 1996 
deliberately seek to mislead the Court since they were taken out 
of context. On one occasion defendants had just purchased a new 
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shed. On the other, they were spring cleaning. 
D. Plaintiff Failed To Make A Prima Facie Case For Summary 
Judgment. 
Plaintiff's affidavit in support of motion for summary 
judgment simply attaches photographs and alleges that the 
"photograph shows the rule violations complained of on the 15-day 
notice," without further comment. (See R.119.) This is simply 
insufficient to make a "prima facie" for summary judgment. The 
pictures cannot "speak for themselves." There must be some 
explanation as to what violations the photographs purport to 
show. Both sets of pictures taken after December 10, 1996, were 
deliberately taken to mislead and confuse the finder of fact. 
The May, 1997, pictures were taken during a short period (two 
days) during which defendants were "spring cleaning" and had 
temporarily cleaned out the shed. (R.188.) The February, 1997, 
pictures were taken right after defendants had purchased another 
shed, which had not been set up yet. (R.193.) 
E. Defendants Should Be Awarded Attorney's Fees. 
Pursuant to Utah Code 57-16-8, the prevailing party is 
entitled to attorney's fees. Defendants should prevail in this 
appeal and attorney's fees should be awarded. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Defendants are entitled to their day in Court on this 
matter. The issue before the finder of fact (in this case, a 
10 
jury) is whether defendants have substantially complied with the 
15-day Notice. The trial court's order granting summary judgment 
should be reversed and defendants awarded their attorney's fees. 
DATED this *ff day of December, 1997. 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorney for Veda Dare 
and Rick Nebeker 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that on this \ day of December, 1997, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants Brief 
were mailed first class, postage prepaid to: 
James R. Boud 
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Murray, UT 84107 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES JACOBSON as General 
Partner of Mobile Park West, 
a Utah General Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-




On June 30, 1997 at the hour of 9:00 a.m, Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was heard before the above Court, the 
Honorable Judge Sheila K. McCleve, presiding, James R. Boud 
appeared on behalf of Plaintiff and Russell A. Cline appeared on 
behalf of Defendants, After thoroughly reviewing the pleadings on 
file and listening to the arguments of counsel, the Court granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Russell then moved the 
Court for an order staying execution of the judgment and 
1 
J 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
/ 
/ \ 3£^ 
C i v i l No, 9609-13552-
Ju^age S h e i l a K. McCleve 
/ 
forthcoming writ of restitution which motion was denied. The Court 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that on April 1, 1995, Defendants 
and Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement for a mobile home 
space located at 246 Fall Street, No. 30, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84116. Said lease agreement required the Defendants to pay a 
monthly rent which presently is $243.00 per month. 
2. Defendants also agreed to abide by the Plaintiffs 
mobile home park rules which are entitled "Good Neighbor Policy" 
and said "Good Neighbor Policy" was incorporated into the lease 
agreement. 
3. On October 29, 1997 Plaintiff served Defendants with 
a landlord's fifteen day notice which informed Defendants that they 
had 15 days to cure the rule violations which was set forth in the 
notice. Said notice contained the following, among other language, 
which is based upon the Utah Mobile Home Statute, Sec. 57-16-
6(2) (a) : "You are hereby notified that you must cure the aforesaid 
violations within fifteen (15) days of the date df service of this 
Notice on you by curing and/or refraining from the above 
violations. If you fail to cure and/or refrain from the referred 
to violations within said fifteen (15) day period, or a written 
agreement is not made between the Park and you allowing for a 
variation in the rule or cure period, or vacate the premises within 
such period of fifteen (15) days, you will be in violation of the 
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above state statute and your lease agreement under rules of the 
park. If you fail to cure said violation(s), eviction will be 
commenced against you to evict you from the premises...." 
4. Said fifteen day notice specifically outlined a 
number of violations which needed to be cured. Plaintiff's 
position is that only one of the six violations had been cured and 
the rest were not cured. Defendants contended that they had cured 
all of the violations except the violation relating to storing 
items in their back yard and around their house and the violation 
relating to painting their shed. 
5. The Court finds that regardless of how many of the 
violations were cured, it was admitted by all parties that two of 
the violations were not cured. The Court finds that the two 
violations which were not cured were very substantial violations, 
especially the violation that related to storing items around the 
yard and around the house. The Court finds that the picture 
exhibits attached to the Affidavit of Brenda Bottoms were not 
contradicted by any credible evidence. The pictures attached as 
Exhibits "D-l" through "0-8" to the affidavit showed the condition 
of the premises relating to the storage of items around the home 
and in the yard prior to or about the time the fifteen day notice 
was served upon the Defendants. Exhibits "E-l" through "E-ll" 
showed the condition of the yard and items stored around the yard 
and home nine days after the fifteen-day eviction notice had 
expired. These pictures, and especially Exhibits "E-4" through "E-
10" showed that no only did the Defendants fail to cure this aspect 
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of the fifteen day notice but they allowed the condition to get 
substantially worse. The Court further finds that the pictures 
attached to the Affidavit of Brenda Bottoms as Exhibits »F-1" 
through "F-IO" were taken 100 days after the fifteen day notice had 
expired. And again show that the Defendants had not cured this 
continuing violation of placing junk and items around the home and 
lot. Exhibits "G-l" through "G-611 to the affidavit which were 
taken 181 days after the fifteen day notice expired again show that 
the condition of items around the home and the yard were still a 
problem and that even as of this late date the fifteen day notice 
had not been cured. 
6. The Court finds that based upon the clear evidence 
of the case, there was absolutely no substantial compliance with 
the fifteen day notice even if the doctrine of substantial 
compliance does apply in this case which the Court finds it does 
not. The Court further finds that the clean up of the items around 
the home and the yard was the major reason the fifteen day notice 
was served and was the major violation set forth in the fifteen day 
notice and that not only was this problem not cured but it clearly 
became worse with time. 
7. The Court finds that the Defendants made no attempt 
to enter into a written agreement with the mobile home park to 
extend the time or allow a variation in the rule or cure period, 
and that any evidence which Defendants may try to introduce to the 
contrary violates the parole evidence rule. 
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8. The Court finds that Defendants' reliance on Rule 
404(b) of the Rules of Evidence is misplaced in that all of the 
photographs attached to the Affidavit of Brenda Bottoms clearly 
show that the requirement set forth in the fifteen day notice to 
remove items that were stored around the home and lot was not cured 
but got worse with time. The pictures were not being introduced to 
show new violations, but merely to prove that the major violations 
set forth in the fifteen day notice had not been cured. 
9. The Court finds that based upon the Affidavit of 
Attorney Fees that was filed at the same time that Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, and further, based upon the 
Supplemental Affidavit filed herewith, that reasonable attorney 
fees in the sum of $ / /C^"—~ should be awarded to the 
/ 
Plaintiff as provided for not only in the parties contract but also 
by Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-15.1 (d) which provides that if an 
eviction action is contested the court shall order court costs and 
attorney fees to the prevailing party. The court further finds 
that costs in the amount of $47.00 should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff. 
10. The Court further finds that rent in the amount of 
$1,701.00 is due from Defendants to Plaintiff through May 31, 1997 
and that rent in the amount of $243.00 is due for the month of 
June, 1997 plus one-half month's rent through July 15, 1997 in the 
amount of $121.50 for a total amount of rent due of $2,065.50. 
11. The Court finds it is reasonable that the lease 
agreement between the parties should be terminated and that 
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restitution of the premises should be granted to the Plaintiff 
which restitution should not be accomplished before July 15, 1997, 
12. The Court further finds that it is reasonable that 
any judgment entered herein relate back to the date of the court 
hearing of June 30, 1997. 
13. The Court finds that the Defendants have paid some 
portion of the rent which is due into the Court and that said sums 
should be turned over to the Plaintiff and Plaintiff should credit 
the Defendants toward any judgment that is rendered herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
hereby makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. The Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 57-
16(2) (a) provides that if a fifteen day notice states that a cure 
is not timely effected, or a written agreement made between the 
mobile home park and the resident allowing for variation in the 
rule or cure period, that eviction proceedings may be initiated 
immediately. The Court further concludes that the fifteen day 
eviction notice in this case was served properly and that it was 
not cured and a written agreement was not made between the parties 
for a variation in the rule or cure period. 
2. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the 
doctrine of substantial compliance as set forth in the case of 
Housing Authority of Salt Lake City v. Delgado. 914 P.2d 1163 (Utah 
App. 1996) does not apply in this case as the Delgado case dealt 
with a "tenant's minor breach" that was "insubstantial" and 
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involved a "negligible amount" involving a mere 96 cents that was 
"merely an oversight." In this case the rule violations which 
Defendants admitted they did not cure were very substantial and, 
with respect to the violation dealing with storing items in the 
back yard and around the home, the violation in fact became 
significantly worse with time. The Court further concludes that 
even if the doctrine of substantial compliance did apply in this 
case that there clearly was no substantial compliance. 
3. The Court further concludes based upon the 
Crescentwood Village Inc. v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 1267 (Utah App. 
1995) that substantial compliance under the Utah Mobile Home Park 
Residency Statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-1 et. seq. is not 
sufficient in that a landlord can insist upon strict compliance 
with the terms of the parties lease agreement (which in this case 
incorporated the park rules). Based upon the Crescentwood case, 
the Court concludes that the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency 
Statute preempts the common law doctrine of substantial compliance 
and allows mobile home park owners to strictly enforce their leases 
and rules. 
4. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not apply in this case to 
prevent the introduction of the picture exhibits attached as 
Exhibits "F" and "G" to the Affidavit of Brenda Bottoms and that 
these pictures were not meant to depict new violations of the rules 
of the park but in fact were depicting the same violations 
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complained of in the original fifteen day notice which violations 
were never cured and became worse with time, 
5. The Court concludes that the parole evidence rule is 
applicable in this case to prevent the Defendants from 
contradicting the fact that the fifteen day notice which was served 
upon them contained a provision which required an agreement in 
writing in order to modify or vary the cure period or rule which 
they were violating. No such written agreement was entered into 
between the parties. 
6. The Court concludes that it is reasonable to award 
the Plaintiff rent in the total sum of $2,065.50 which will accrue 
through July 15, 1997, the date the premises is to be restored to 
the Plaintiff, attorney fees of $ cP ^ / O ~~~ # court costs of 
$47.00, and order terminating the lease between the parties and 
granting restitution of the premises located at 246 Fall Street 
#30, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. 
7. The Court concludes that any rent which has been 
paid into Court by the Defendants should be turned over to the 
Plaintiff by the Clerk of Court and that credit should be given for 
the amount of said rent on any judgment rendered herein. 
DATED this / 7 day of July, 1997. ^::;r.--
8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed postage prepaid 
o n t h e
 ^y d a Y o f J u lY* 1997, to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
Crippen & Cline 
Attorneys for Defendants 
310 South Main 
Suite #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841Q 
c:\files\Mob-Park. Wst\Findings 
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James R. Boud, :,a #A0388 
Troy K. Walker, USB #7663 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER & BOUD. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 263-0338 
1 F3"^ 
JUL 1 5 <??7 
T-.s of Day. Z; j^*. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES JACOBSON as General 
Partner of Mobile Park West, 
a Utah General Partnership, 
-v-




f * i v i II III " i I 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
The Court having reviewed the memorandum relating to 
Plai i,> nihil uii the 
arguments counse, . , having entered the Findings of Fact am 1 
Conclusions t - »* i. f i herewith, therefore, 
j. * HEREBY ORDERED, ADJT 
have judgment against Defendants < follows: 
I l Hi principal representing rent through July is, 
1 9 9 7 , ! h e ilYiff? t IIP p r IMII i s e s si 
s u m ut ',!<>, iiJ*ili, "ji'i 
2. For court costs of $47.00. 
3. For reasonable attorney fees in the sum of 
4. It is further ordered that the total judgment of 
$ 5f 222, shall bear interest as provided by law until paid in 
full. It is further ordered that Plaintiff is awarded its after-
accruing costs and after-accruing attorney fees. Before the award 
of any after-accruing attorney fees, Plaintiff must file a 
supplemental affidavit of attorney fees and make a motion to the 
Court to augment the judgment granted herein. 
5. It is ordered that the Clerk of Court turn over to 
Plaintiff all rent which has been paid into the Court by the 
Defendants and Plaintiff is to credit this judgment for the amounts 
so turned over to it. 
6. It is further ordered that the lease agreement 
between the parties is hereby terminated and that Plaintiff shall 
have restitution of the premises located at 246 Fall Street, #30, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. 
7. This judgment shall be effective nluac prri tnnoiito 
the—date-of—-Juno 30-7—±&97~r the day this judgment was rendered in 
open court, and the time for enforcement of the Writ of Restitution 
in this case shall begin to run from said date. It is further 
ordered, however, that Plaintiff may not complete restitution of 
the premises until July^15^ 1997 based upon representations of 
Plaintiff's counsel made at the hearing on June 30, 1997. 
2 
•8. The Clerk of the Court is hereby authorized to Issue 
a Wi::i t c 'f R e s t J t u t J DI i :i i i f a v c i : • : f 1 1 a :! i i 1:::!: f f f- : :i : !::1 le pr emi ses 
located a t 24 6 F< \1 1 Street, #3 0, Sa] t "' '-- City, Utah, 84116, and 
the lease agreement between the parties hereby terminated. 
I ccordance with Utah Code ^n, t — 7b-3o-iu.D, 
Deieiid.iji'l <• teljy \\\ ;i in nul ice that Defendants sha I vacate the 
leased premises described above, shall remove al] personal property 
therefrom and restore possession * *• ^remises to the Plaintiff 
ci M i . I >*•-1 Hiii'tinl s shrill h n | M I ,I M t o r i l f o r 
Constable Defendants, pursuant * • representations _: P l a i n t i f f s 
counsel, shall have unt ily I*- •« -* *t<=> *-*e p r e m i e s . 
I nasi! . - g 
the Writ , - destitution pursuant .:v made by attorney 
Russel which *~ Court declinec *;*- Defendant ->. not 
furthe :e 
premises pending appeal oi any action, f Defendants . *. 
comply with this Order within the t -.- prescribed, the Sheriff or 
Constable may enter the ] eased i • ic /^  i : « = n i : <= t:::l 11= Defei idants 
and any personal property < the Defendants, which property will bo 
transported to a suitable locatior i<.- storage. -'*.>t personal 
property shall be stored for 1 
Irjin the premises for it-.. • , demand , ,-* -. , it- ,* . • ;. -
thirty (30) days, the Sherif: onstabl- in-.. . -\.x::: the 
personal propert * - Defendants upon payment < vr\<u DI iab] e 
'i : os l::s :i i ;u :n u i ed ^ al and storage b. " efendants. If 
the Defendants fail ww make a demand within thirty (30) days or 
fail to pay reasonable costs incurred for the removal and storage 
of the personal property, the person storing the property shall 
have the right to sell it at a public sale after expiration of said 
thirty (3 0) days. If the Defendants claim that any other person 
owns the property then the Defendants, said person shall file a 
written request for return of the property with the Constable or 
Sheriff, 
< ^ 
DATED this / 7 day of July, 1997. 
BY THE CO 
Honorable S^e^av^. ;H$Cleve 
Third^Uistriot Coair^Jiidqe 
CERTIFICATE OF MKHg»gr-t 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF RESTITUTION was mailed postage prepaid on the 
? „ day of July, 1997, to the following: 
Russell A, Cline 
Crippen & Cline 
Attorneys for Defendants 
310 South Main 
Suite #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 
c \filcs\Mob-ParlLWst\Judgmcnt 
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